Suomen turvallisuuspolitiikka on muuttunut nopeammin ja radikaalimmin kuin Ruotsin. Hyväksyttyään muotoilun sotilaallisesta liittoutumattomuudesta ja itsenäisestä puolustuksesta 1992 hallitus jätti pois ilmauksen "puolueettomuus" jo vuoden 1995 turvallisuuspoliittisen selonteon.
Seuraavassa, 1997 annetussa raportissa kerrottiin selkeämmin mahdollisuudesta ottaa vastaan sotilaallista apua ulkopuolelta: "Mikäli Suomen omat resurssit eivät ole riittävät, se voi YK:n peruskirjan mukaisesti pyytää muiden maiden apua hyökkäyksen torjumisessa". Tämän mukaisesti ilmaus "itsenäinen puolustus" korvattiin "uskottavalla puolustuksella".
Suomalaiset ovat alkaneet ruotsalaisia aikaisemmin ja suoremmin puhua maan turvallisuuspolitiikan optioista eivätkä ole sulkeneet pois Nato-jäsenyyttä. Erityisen selvää tämä oli Martti Ahtisaaren presidenttikaudella. Ahtisaari käytännössä vakiinnutti Suomen mahdollisuuden liittyä Natoon, ottamatta tässä huomionn Venäjän mielipidet-tä.
Vastikään Ahtisaari ilmoitti avoimesti Suomen Nato-jäsenyyden olevan välttämätön sanoen, että tilanne, jossa maa jäisi liittoutuman ulkopuolelle, muuttuisi hankalaksi.
Halosen linja erilainen
Vuonna 2001 Ahtisaaren tilalle presidentiksi tulleen Tarja Halosen asenne on hyvin selkeä. Virkaanastujaisissaan hän totesi, että se hänestä riippuu, Suomi pysyy liittoutumattomana maana. Tämän kannan presidentti on toistanut myöhemminkin.
Yhdessä viimeaikaisista lausunnoistaan hän korosti jälleen, että tällä hetkellä ei ole perusteita muuttaa liittoutumattomuuspolitiikkaa muuttamiselle, ja Suomelle on välttämätöntä säilyttää tilanne, jossa sen on mahdollista osallistua Euroopan turvallisuusjärjestelyihin, vaikka se ei ole Naton jäsen.
Ei ole syytä epäillä presidentti Halosen nykyisen kannan vilpittömyyttä. Mutta on syytä pitää mielessä, että optiopolitiikka säilytetään, eivätkä mahdolliset skenaariot riipu pelkästään presidentin hyvästä tahdosta. On muistettava, että vuoden 2000 perustuslakiuudistuksen myötä presidentin valtaoikeuksia ulko- ja puolustuspolitiikassa supistettiin ratkaisevasti pääministerin ja eduskunnan eduksi.
Esimerkiksi entisen pääministerin Paavo Lipposen (sd) Nato-kanta oli epämääräisempi kuin presidentin. Keskustapuolueen (entinen) puheenjohtaja Anneli Jäätteenmäki arvosteli 2002 Lipposen hallituksen turvallisuuspolitiikkaa vastaan ja oli vakuuttunut, että Suomen pysyy liittoutumattomana.
Puolesta ja vastaan
Pohjimmiltaan käsite optioista eli turvallisuuspolitiikan kehittämisen erilaisista vaihtoehdoista ei itsessään anna aihetta vastalauseisiin. Se heijastuu monien maiden, myös Venäjän, ulko- ja puolustuspoliittisissa doktriineissa, eikä se ole ristiriidassa Ety-järjestön hyväksymien periaatteiden kanssa kunkin maan oikeudesta tehdä itsenäisesti päätöksiä oman turvallisuutensa alalta.
Olisi kuitenkin virhe tehdä tästä oikeudesta absoluuttinen. Kun valitaan jotakin vaihtoehtoa, on tarpeen ottaa huomioon myös muiden maiden turvallisuusedut, niiden mahdolliset huolenaiheet ja laskea, miten se vaikuttaisi tilanteeseen lähialueella ja kansainväliseen tilanteeseen laajemminkin.
Yleisesti ottaen ne perustelut, joita Suomessa ja Ruotsissa käytetään Nato-jäsenyyden puolesta, ovat monessa suhteessa samanlaisia kuin monissa muissa liittoutuman jäseniksi pyrkivissä maissa.
On totta, että "Venäjän uhkaa", nykyisen Venäjän taholta tulevan mahdollisen sotilaallisen hyökkäyksen merkityksessä, ei mainita erotuksena balteista suoraan. Harvat suomalaiset ja ruotsalaiset uskovat siihen. Enemmänkin keskustellaan riskeistä, jotka liittyvät mahdollisuuteen, että Venäjän tilanne muuttuisi epävakaaksi.
Viime aikoina esille on noussut uusi perustelu. Muutamat suomalaiset tutkijat ja poliitikot ovat ottaneet esille ajatuksen, että Suomen Nato-jäsenyys voisi jopa edesauttaa Venäjän etuja. Esimerkiksi Christer Pursiainen ja Sinikukka Saari - vaikka tunnustavatkin, että joitakin riskejä Venäjän ja Suomen suhteille on olemassa - vakuuttavat, että "Suomen Nato-jäsenyys voisi olla keino edistää yhteistyötä Venäjän ja lännen välillä".
Monet Suomessa ovat epäilleet tuollaisen väitteen oikeellisuutta. Niinpä entinen presidentti Mauno Koivisto Kosovoon viitaten totesi käyneen jälleen selväksi, että suurvallat hallitsevat Natoa. Hän teki johtopäätöksen, että "mikäli Suomi liittyisi Natoon, sen mahdollisuudet vaikuttaa liittoutuman päätöksentekoon olisivat marginaaliset".
On ilmaistu mielipide, että Naton jäsenyys voisi vaikuttaa Suomen ja Venäjän erityissuhteisiin, voisi provosoida Venäjän vastatoimiin ja rikkoa Pohjois-Euroopan tasapainoa.
Jotkut asiantuntijat varoittavat, ettei ole mitään syytä aliarvioida Venäjän yleisen mielipiteen reaktiota Suomen jäsenyyteen, joka nähtäisiin merkkinä paitsi epäystävällisestä, ehkä myös petollisesta maasta, kun otetaan huomioon Venäjällä viime vuosikymmenten aikana muotoutunut kuva Suomesta.
Olisi ennenaikaista pohtia, millaisiin vastatoimiin Venäjä voisi ryhtyä. Erilaiset skenaariot ovat mahdollisia. Vain yksi asia on varma - Venäjä ei voi pysyä passiivisena, jos Nato tulee lähelle sen luoteisrajoja alueille, joilla on erityinen merkitys koko maan puolustuksen kannalta.
Venäjän ja Suomen raja on kaikkein pisin, noin 1 300 kilometriä, maamme kosketuspinta lännen kanssa. Jos lisäämme tähän yhteiset rajat Baltian maiden ja Norjan kanssa, jakolinja Venäjän ja Naton välillä kulkisi koko pohjoisen Euroopan ja Itämeren alueen läpi.
On vaikea kiistää, että Suomen ja Ruotsin irtisanoutuminen sotilaallisesta liittoutumattomuudesta voi merkittävällä tavalla vaikuttaa Pohjois-Euroopan tilanteeseen. Voi olettaa, että ensimmäisenä siitä kärsisi vakiintunut alueellinen ja rajojen yli Venäjän kanssa tehtävä yhteistyö. EU:n pohjoinen ulottuvuus, jonka pääperiaatteena on "myönteinen keskinäinen riippuvuus", menettäisi täysin merkityksensä ja elinmahdollisuutensa.
Vielä yksi asia. Ei ole täysin mahdotonta, että Naton "sateenvarjoa" voitaisiin käyttää "Karjalan kysymyksestä" käytävän keskustelun virittämiseksi, vaikka enemmistö suomalaisista katsoo, että sodan jälkeisten rajojen muuttaminen olisi epärealistista, ja Suomen poliittisen johtajien kanta on selvä.
Uhkista ei ole kyse
Askeleita kohti Natoa on otettu todella paljon, ja kehitys vain jatkuu. On esimerkiksi sopeutettu asevoimia Naton standardeihin, parannettu yhteistyötä Naton kanssa osallistumisessa yhteisiin harjoituksiin sekä syvennetty joukkojen yhteensopivuutta rauhankumppanuussopimuksen puitteissa jne.
Monessa suhteessa Ruotsi on samanlaisella linjalla, mutta Suomi on pidemmällä. Suomalaiset tutkijat Tapani Vaahtoranta ja Tuomas Forsberg arvioivat, että Suomi on Ruotsia syvemmin mukana läntisessä integraatiossa turvallisuuden alalla.
Joka tapauksessa, kun Suomen poliittinen johto lopulta päättää kannastaan, tarpeellinen työ on jo tehty, ja Nato-jäsenyyteen liittyviin sotilaallisiin kysymyksiin liittyviä ongelmia - moniin muihin liittoutuman laajenemisen "toisen aallon" maihin verrattuna - ei tule.
Lyhyesti sanoen, jos luopuminen sotilaallisesta liittoutumattomuudesta muuttuu tosiasiaksi, se ei tapahdu siksi, että sotilaalliset tai muut uhat olisivat tulleet lähemmäksi. Se olisi looginen tulos "askel askeleelta" toteutetusta lähentymispolitiikasta ja sotilaallis-poliittisesta yhteistyöstä Naton rakenteiden kanssa.
Syytä olla valmiina
Uskon kuitenkin, että lopullinen poliittinen päätös vaatii aikaa, kaikista mahdollisista kehitysvaihtoehdoista riippuen. Mutta on tarpeen olla valmiina etukäteen. Joka tapauksessa on tuskin mahdollista odottaa, että suomalaiset tiedottaisivat siitä venäläisille etukäteen ja vielä vähemmän, että he olisivat halukkaita keskustelemaan siitä kanssamme, niin kuin oli tapana Neuvostoliiton ja Suomen välisissä suhteissa, vaikkakin 1980-luvun lopulla Suomi luopui tästä käytännöstä.
Todennäköisimmin me saisimme virallisesti kuulla siitä tapahtuneena tosiasiana.
Vuosi 2004 on mainittu yhä useammin monien asiantuntijoiden analyyseissä ja joidenkin poliitikkojen lausunnoissa. Ei ole mahdotonta, että Suomen sotilaallista liittoutumattomuuspolitiikkaa voitaisiin muuttaa samaan aikaan, kun sekä Nato että EU ottavat uusia jäseniä.
Henkilökohtaisesti katson, että noin radikaali askel vaatii enemmän aikaa, ottaen huomioon, että lopullista päätöstä Baltian valtioiden Nato-jäsenyydestä ei ole vielä tehty. Voidaan kuitenkin odottaa, että väli Suomen ja Ruotsin Nato-jäsenyyden ja Baltian maiden jäsenyyden välillä olisi lyhyt, ehkä parin vuoden luokkaa.
Mahdollisesti myös Ruotsissa asiat kehittyvät samalla tavalla. Voidaan odottaa, että molemmat maat toimivat koordinoidusti ja jättävät Nato-hakemuksensa samaan aikaan kuten tapahtui EU:n suhteen."
LUE JURI DERJABININ KIRJOITUS VENÄJÄKSI
WHETHER EVERYTHING IS SO QUIET IN NORTHERN EUROPE? ( Some problems of military-political security in the region)
Let's begin from the point, that, in my view, it exists ( at least in Russia) some non-balance in the estimation of the general situation in the North of Europe, including its military-political dimension. Often, we meet too positive picture of development in this region, sometimes, on the contrary, the excessive emphasis on negative moments - quite often in the spirit of the old thinking.
It is generally accepted, that for that last years on the foreground in Northern Europe are problems of civil, "«soft" security. Nevertheless, also today military-political aspects of security in the region remain important. Though they do not play such a role as earlier, it is impossible to reset them completely from the accounts, including the formation of the all-Northern concept of the security and, certainly, Russian foreign and defensive policy.
In the whole the northwest flank of Russia, representing the strategically important zone from the point of view of the national security, remains quietest for today. The states of this region themselves do not carry neither military, nor economic threat to interests of Russia.
The region of Northern Europe in the all-European frameworks, using common criterions of the security, creates, perhaps, least problems and remains the most stable one - anyway, in comparison with many other parts of the continent. The danger of occurrence of open conflicts, and, furthermore, military confrontation seems ( at least in the near future) to be poorly real.
But is it possible to assert, that in military-political respect there are no challenges and threats for the security of Northern Europe?
We should not absolutizate the рositive estimation of the situation in the region and project it on all possible scenarios of European and global development in the future, including relations between Russia and USA/NATO. Despite of many positive factors which has appeared for the last decade in the region, some elements of instability, uncertainty and even possibilities of conflicts, including armed, are still remaining in Northern Europe.
This is acknowleged in the countries of Northern Europe as well, both at the official level, and in researches of the experts. From the Russian side, unfortunately, it is given less attention to these aspects (except for the Baltic problematics).
Threats potential, real and virtual
In the Finnish Government's White Paper on Security and Defence Policy of 2001 are allocated following main kinds of threats: regional and local conflicts. that may also affect Finland; political, economic or military pressure, which includes threat of use of military force or its limited use; strategic military strike aimed at paralysing national leadership and the functioning of the society; large-scale attack with the purpose of capture of the important areas or use of territory of Finland for operations against the third party.
In his turn, Swedish researcher Olav F.Knudsen considers, that the conflicts, which can arise, will be characterized hardly by direct use of force. Rather, it could be the highly charged, tense political situation, where use of force is somehow "in the air ». However, in his opinion, it is impossible to exclude other, more dramatic scenarios, including such as: demonstrations( e.g. on sitizenship issues) turning violent; paramilitary units of extremist groups taking political action using military means; external, roque military forces or forces of other governments intervening, either on behalf of demonstrating groups or to seize infrastructure facilities ( harbours, transport routes, etc.).
The specified list of threats for the security of European North can be continued. For example, continuing military activity of NATO in the region (though many asserts, that it was reduced, referring to reformation of NATO Command Structure and liquidation of northern headquarter in Kolsaas near Oslo). So, Russia still has concerns on some moments connected to the activity of NATO in Scandinavian countries - the members of the alliance.
In particular, deployment of the multifunctional radiorelay station "Globus ÏI " in Varde ( near border with Russia) , which, according to our military experts, can be used for detection and investigation of start-up of the Russian ground and sea based ballistic missiles. This RLS, as well as radar and radioelectronic stations on Spitsbergen can become an important element in the American ABM - system. Though Prime Minister of Norway J.Stoltenberg during his visit to Moscow in June, 2001 assured, that the fears of the Russian side are unreasonable.
Similar problems are connected to the possible inclusion of RLS in Thule (Greenland) in the American ABM.
Likewise, Norways renouncing of the prohibition of military activity with participation of foreign forces east to 24* longitude in Finmark could not promote strengthening of security and confidence. As a result of this decision, military exercises ( officially within the framework of the PfP) has been conducted close to the borders of the Russian Federation. I am not so sure, that Russia's refusal to take part in such exercises was the only possible variant, but, anyway, its political logic is clear.
The Baltic question
Only shortly about this problematics ( it is in detail examined in the Russian researches). No doubts, that the development of the situation in Northern Europe first of all is connected to the Baltic subregion, which, becoming the integral part of Northern Europe and having increased its importance at the all-European plan, has at the same time caused many problems from the point of view of the whole region.
The main problem is, certainly, the aspiration of Baltic countries to join NATO. In case of such development , especially in the nearest future, it will be hardly possible to avoid serious complications both in Russia's relations with these countries (that may also affect relations with other northern neighbours), and in the further formation of the situation in the whole Northern Europe. The actions of USA and NATO against Yugoslavia in connection with Kosovo only strenghened the position of Russia in this question what is a matter of principle for her.
The direct relation to problems of the security of the Baltic Sea subregion and, hence, of the whole European North has Kaliningrad. For the time being more attention is given to problems, which arise in connection with the membership of Baltic countries in the EU ( transit etc.). But there are also important military-political aspects connected to the second wave of NATO expansion.
From the military point of view Kaliningrad always, especially during the cold war has have a special place in the defence policy of our country. Here was stationed the Head quarter of the Baltic fleet, and were concentrated large naval, air and overland armed forces .
After the block-no-block confrontation disappeared and radical changes in Europe and her northern part has appeared, Russia, unilaterally, has made significant reorganization and reducing of armed forces in the Kaliningrad area. If earlier the common average of armed forces in this area made more than 200 000, it has decreased by March, 2001 to 25 000. The quantity of large surface ships, submarines, battle planes and helicopters, tanks, MBT, and artillery is reduced. By the end of 2003 the further reduction of military forces in the Kaliningrad area to 8 600 is planned. And we have to have in mind that the CFE flank restrictions are not applied for Kaliningrad.
From time to time there are some speculations in the West about tactical nuclear weapon in Kaliningrad area, Answering this question, former Commander-in-Chief of the Baltic fleet, nowadays Governor of Kaliningrad W.Jegorow emphasized: « we never has made secrets that the Baltic fleet has tactical missiles, but without nuclear war-heads".
Certainly, the importance of Kaliningrad for maintenance of Russia's national security will be kept also in the future. Concrete scenarios would depend on the further development of the situation in the world and in Europe, including her northern part and the Baltic sea. The position of Russia concerning Baltic states membership in NATO has not changed and hardly may change.
If nevertheless, those states will become members of NATO, which military-political orientation evidently has proved to be true in connection with aggression against Yugoslavia, it will essentially change the situation in the Baltic Sea region, including transformation of Kaliningrad into a Russian enclave not only inside EU, but also inside the northern flank of NATO.
The result may be that Russia will be compelled to go on measures, which both from political, economic, and military points of view will affect Northwestern part of the Russian Federation bordering to Northern Europe, including, certainly, the Kaliningrad area. It would not be desirable now to discuss possible « adequate measures », though one should be sure, that our generals have various variants, which, indeed, can not be accepted without the decision at the highest political level.
Optical line "of «options"
It is common to declare, that an important precondition for the stability in Northern Europe is the present military non-alignment policy of Sweden and Finland. Actually, only by such ascertaining, anyway, in the official statements, Russia limits her approach to the security policy of these countries. It consists also, as a rule, a point of departure for researches, published on this theme by Russian authors( there are not so numerous). For example, the report published by the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy (SVOP) « Interests of Russia in North of Europe: what they are? » (March, 2001) asserts, that the current official positions of Finland and Sweden are "clear enough" and « do not give essential reasons for interpretations or occurrence of doubts ».
A deeper analysis, which would count various possible variants of development, we meet rather seldom. There is maybe worth to mention only reports prepared be RISS and RAU in 2000 and A.Fedorov's article in " Nezavisimaja Cazeta" ( August,2001)
One may not but agree with the positive estimation of the Swedish and Finnish line of military non-alignment. But at the same time it is necessary to take into account also that fact, that this policy is in a constant dynamics, and from time to time some essential correctives are brought into it. The possibility of preservation of this policy in the future is not indisputable.
This may be testified by significant changes which have taken place in security policy of Sweden and Finland for the last decade.
It is necessary to tell, that the security policy of Finland has been transformed by faster rates and in a more radical way , than in Sweden. Having accepted the formulation of military non-alignment and independent defense in 1992 , the Government excluded the notion of "neutrality" already in the report to the Parliament on security policy of 1995. In the next report submitted in 1997, there was told more clearer about an opportunity of reception of the military assistance from the outside: « if Finland's own resources are not sufficient, she can, in accordance with the UN Charter, request the assistance of other countries in repelling the attack «. Accordingly, the formulation "independent" defense was replaced by "credible" defense.
The Finns earlier and more articulated , than the Swedes, have begun to speak about "options" for the security policy of the country, not excluding the possibility of NATO membership. Especially it was evident in the period, when M.Ahtisaari was the President (1994- 2000) and actually fixed the possibility of NATO-option hereby not taking into account the opinion of Russia. Recently, Ahtisaari openly declared necessity of Finland's membership in NATO, saying that the situation where the country remain outside of the alliance becomes inconvenient.
Nevertheless, in the official statements there has been still emphasized , that «for the time being. Finland does not suffer from any security deficit» and is not going, accordingly, to join NATO. Tarja Halonen, replaced in 2001 Ahtisaari as the President, has the attitude that is enough clear. At the inauguration she declared: « Finland, as far as it depends on me, remain the non-aligned country ». This position the President has confirmed also later. In one of last statements she again emphasized, that the reasons for a change of non-alignment policy now is not present, and it is necessary for Finland to maintain the situation, when it is possible for her to participate in the European security, not being the member of NATO.
There are no reasons to doubt the sincerity of president Halonen's present position. But it is necessary to have in mind, that the policy of «options" is kept, and the eventual scenarios will depend not only on good will of Tarja Halonen. We have to remember that, according to the Constitutional reform of 2000, prerogatives of the president in foreign and defence policy were essentially reduced to benefit of the prime minister and parliament. For example, the position of former Prime Minister P.Lipponen ( Social-democrat Party) on NATO-issue was more uncertain then those of the President. A.Jaatteenmaki, the Сhairperson in the Center Party that has been in opposition until parliamentary elections in March 2003 and become in April the Prime Minister, attacked in 2002 Lipponen's Governement's security policy and believed that Finland should remain non-aligned and that membership in the EU and active participation elsewhere suffice quite well. She hinted at NATO's action in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and the increasing division in Europe that would result from Finland's possible NATO membership.
In the new Government's program there is stated, that « Finland's foreign- and security policy has been based on military non-alignment and credible defence The Government would concider foreign-and security policy of Finland in a broader context in a White Paper to be presented in 2004.»
Sweden changed the formulation of the official security policy safety only recently. Since 1992 the government invariable declared, that "Sweden's military non-alignment, which aims to allow our country to remain neutral in the event of a war in our nearby region, remains unchanged". At the end of 90-th this formulation became a subject of brisk discussion and criticism (first of all from the bourgeois parties) as "«irrelevant" in changing conditions ( e.g. enlargement of EU and expansion of NATO).
As a result the social-democrat government reached in February, 2002 a compromise with the opposition on a new wording. It does not mention the necessity of " remaining neutral", but mainly stresses greater "openness" of military non-alignment during peacetime in security cooperation (i.e. "«options"): " ...threats to peace and security can be repelled most efficiently with collective actions and in cooperation with other countries".8 Though, NATO directly is not mentioned, many - both supporters, and the opponents of the membership in the alliance - interpret the fresh wording as an opening opportunity of preparations to such a variant.
Well, similar ideas were launched also earlier by some representatives of the Swedish government. So, in March, 1997 Foreign minister L.Hjelm Wallen in joint article with her Finnish colleque (then it was T.Halonen) stressed, that Sweden and Finland « keep freedom in a choice of the contents and forms of their relations with political and military cooperation developing in Europe ».9 However, officially this position was fixed only five years later.
Basically, the concept "of «options", e.g. various variants of development of security policy does not cause in itself any special objections. It is reflected for- in one or other form -in foreign policy and defence doctrines of many countries, including Russia, and does not contradict to the principles approved by OSCE concerning the right of each country independently to make decisions in the field of own security. However, it would be incorrect to make this right to an absolute. Choosing this or that variant, it is necessary also to take into account interests of the security of other countries, their possible concerns, and to calculate, how it will affect the situation in the nearby region and the international situation in a broader sense.
Anyway, discussion in Finland and Sweden on eventual membership in NATO is growing, though mainly at the level of experts and in mass media. However, some official persons as well are being ever more engaged in it.
In this connection I can not but recollect one episode from my time as the first Russian ambassador to Finland. In March, 1995 the question on eventual membership of Finland in NATO was mentioned in an interview to the newspaper "Vasabladet". I told then, that it would undoubtedly cause a negative reaction of Russia and said that an open discussion on this issue could be useful. As a result, I was invited to Finnish Foreign Ministry, where its representative in a veiled form expressed perplexity concerning my statements and let me understand, that the discussion on this "«hypothetical" question is inappropriate. And one of the newspapers even required to announce me "person non-grata".
"Pro" and "contra"
Generally, the arguments for NATO membership used in Finland and Sweden, are in many respects similar to those of many other countries applying for the joining the alliance. Though, the « Russian threat », in sense of an possibility of a military attack from the present Russia is not mentioned directly - there are few Finns and Swedes who believes in it. Under more discussion are risks connected to possibility of a destabilization in Russia.
For the last time a new argument has appeared. Some Finnish researchers and politicians has launched the idea, that Finland's membership in NATO even will promote interests of Russia. For example, Ch.Pursiainen and S.Saari ( although recognizing, that certain risks for the Fînnish-Russian relations do exist), asserte that "Finnish NATO membership could be an instrument to promote cooperation between Russia and the "West" Finland will receive a new channel for advancing Russias integration of Russia into Western institutions... Finland could promote the development of NATO's role, especially in Northern Europe, in a direction that would benefit Finland's interests and which also Russia could feel perceive as constructive".10 There are many in Finland who express doubts in the validity of such arguments.
So, former President M.Koivisto, referring to Kosovo, declared, that "it became again obvious, that big powers are dominating NATO , and he made the conclusion, that " if Finland joined NATO, her chances to influence the decision-making of the alliance would be marginal".11 Similar doubts are expressed also in Finnish military circles. General G.Hegglund heading Finnish Defence Forces, already some years ago stated that « through NATO the United States want to receive authority for rendering political influence «. Analyzing the decisions of NATO's Prague summit, Finnish researcher P.Visuri judges, that NATO does not turn into a wide security organization for Europe, but continues to act as the military alliance, firmly headed by USA. 12
Really, as to an opportunity to influence decisions made in NATO, especially on concrete military and political issues, it would be hardly possible. The experience confirms this. In the best case it could be limited to "footnote's", which are fixed, but do not hinder a consensus. Such a line was carried out, for example, by Denmark and Norway, and recently by Turkey. But I can't remember examples, when any small NATO country has taken advantage of the actual right of the veto. Well, and if consensus is not reached, there are many opportunities to bypass the situation. The latest example — US military action against Iraq.
In discussion on membership in NATO there are put forward many powerful arguments against We shall mention some of them.
There is expressed an opinion, that NATO membership would affect the special relations between Finland with Russia, could provoke Russia on answer-back steps and disturb the existing balance in Northern Europe. General G.Hegglund declared in an interview for Reuter in 1999: « We have good relations with Russia. Why would we destroy them for the sake of such membership, which we do not need. Besides it would cause unnecessary tension in relations between Russia and West". Some experts warn, that there is no reason to underestimate the reaction of the Russian public opinion to Finnish membership, which would be seen as sign not only of an unfriendly country but perhaps also of a treacherous one, taking into account Finlands image, which has been formed in Russia during post-war decades. I for my part would not exclude it.
There would be prematurely now to consider, what answer-back steps may undertake Russia, the various scenarios are possible. There is evident only one thing - Russia can not remain passive, if NATO would come closely to her northwest borders, to the regions having the special importance for whole country's defense. The Rissian-Finnish border is the most extended (about 1300 km.) touching line of our country with the West. If we add to this common borders to the Baltic states and Norway, the dividing line between Russia and NATO will pass across the whole North of Europe and the region of the Baltic sea.
Referring to arguments of the opponents of NATO membership, Finnish researcher T.Ries (he himself belongs to the most active supporters) writes: » by joining NATO Finland would in fact enter the political and military front-line between Russia and the West. In periods of tension Finland's exposed position would make her vulnerable to political pressure and increase Russian incentives to launch a pre-emptive military strike against Finland. In the event of outright conflict Finland would become a military battlefield between east and west, and in the worst case a direct nuclear target."13
That fact that the Finlands and Swedens eventual denouncing of military non-alignment may significally affect the situation in Northern Europe, is difficult to dispute. Ten of eleven countries of " a new Northern Europe" (to which now belong, besides "«traditional" Nordic countries and Baltic states, also northwestern regions of Russia and Baltic parts of Germany and Poland) would become members of the military alliance. One may assume, that as the first one the established system of regional and transborder cooperation, first of all with Russia will suffer. The Northern Dimension of EU, in which the main principle is the "positive interdependence ", would completely lose its sense and viability.
Many opponents of NATO membership put forward the question: is the EU membership not enough for Finland "s security ? Let's remind, that President M.Koivisto in his memoirs writes:the strongest reason for seeking EU membership seemed to me lie in the realm of security policy. The economic reasons were secondary". 14 The expansion of NATO, including Finland and Sweden would essentially limit opportunities of these countries to keep an influential role within the framework of the European Union, which they could play till now ( an example - Finnish initiative on the Northern Dimension). Let's not overlook the fact, that eight of ten future members of the EU are at the same time candidates for membership in NATO. The former non-aligned countries should be obliged to act in the EU according to common positions determined in NATO. One problem more. There is no absolutely unthinkable, that NATO "umbrella" may be used for activating of discussions on " Karelian issue". Though the majority of the Finns considers, that a changing of post-war borders would be unrealistic, and the position of Finnish political leaders is clear enough.
Recently an interesting moment has appeared, to which it would be worth to pay attention, but yet not making any comments on it. According to some information, the Finns have begun to sound a possibility to prolong ahead of schedule the Agreement of 1962 between USSR and Finland about leasing of the Soviet part of the Saimaa channel and island Maly Vysotsky ( expires only in 2012). Let's remind, that President Urho Kekkonen (1956-1982 ) named this agreement « an exclusive concession, which was made to us by the Soviet Union, having transferred a part of the state territory to the usage of an other state » and noted, that «the precondition for this are mutual trust and friendship between our countries ». In the preamble of the agreement is emphasized, that it is made, « recognizing that friendly good-neighbourhood relations based on the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance of 1948 between USSR and Finland would develop favorably also in the future »
As a whole I can' but agree with opinion expressed, for example, by P.Visuri that « it is not visible, that the membership in NATO should give Finland such benefits, which would weigh down negative moments and risks connected to participation in the military alliance In the world, where the policy of force dominates, there is still useful to remember a wisdom from Paasikivi (President of Finland in 1946-1956 ), that is necessary to keep away from the contradictions between big powers. It was a main point of the basic line of Finland's security policy during the cold war and has kept its validaty also during EU membership. The membership in NATO will deprive Finns of this opportunity".15
2004 - time to make decision?
It is necessary to note, that the majority of political elite and public opinion in Sweden and Finland is supporting now present policy of military non-alignment and opposing the realization of NATO-option.
In Sweden, for example, only two political parties are in favour of the NATO membership - Swedish Liberal Party and, more cautious, the conservative Moderate Party. In view of leaders of these parties Sweden and Finland should join NATO simultaneously with the Baltic states. In Finland there are no party which openly supports NATO membership.
The only party that has taken a clear stance for Finland's NATO membership - the Yong Finns (Nuorsuomalaiset) did not manage to get any seats in the 1999 parliamentary elections and decided to close down.
According to the polls carried out in Finland in 1995 - beginning of 2003 , attitudes towards NATO membership has shown constant fluctuations, though the supporters have always been in significant minority. The most number consisted 29 % in November, 1998, the lowest - 19 % in December, 1999 (after Kosovo). In December, 2000 "«for" were 25 %., "«against" - 66 %. In February, 2003 the number of supporters of NATO made 24 %, and opponents 56 %. 16 The Swedish public opinion is more positively concerning membership in NATO, though some fluctuations also are characteristic for it (after Kosovo only 22 %). During polls about one third of the Swedes has supported Sweden's NATO membership. About 60% would maintain military non-alignment.
But the question is, in what extend public opinion would be taken into account at the decisions-making at the political level. Many Finns, for example, are convinced that preparations for NATO membership have been already done in secrecy.
Recently well known Finnish political columnist P.Ervasti and Member of the Parliament, deputy Chairman of the Defence committee J.Laakso stated it openly in their book " Karhun naapurista NATON kainaloon" . They write, that interoperability of Finland's defence forces with NATO structures and harmonization of foreign policy and security policy of the country with the military-political purposes of EU and the NATO has taken place stealthily, partially secretly. The majority of the citizens hardly know, how deep Finland has already been in the Western military camp and what obligations and duties follow from this". There has been emphasized, that « all this has been taken place without an open and honest civil discussion. There was a process, which was characterized by a secrecy-making, misleading and using a half-truth. The decisions were made in a narrow circle ». 17
As to steps on the way of rapproachement NATO, there has been made really much, and the development goes on growing. There are i.a. adoptation of the armed forces to the standards of NATO, improvement of interaction with NATO by participation in joint exercises (last example - large scaled exercises in Poland in 2002), and use for a deepening of interoperability with NATO in the frameworks of PfP etc. In many respects Sweden has followed the similar line, but Finland has been more advanced. Finnish researchers T.Vaahtoranta and T.Forsberg, comparing the approach of both countries to membership in NATO, judge, that Finland is more than Sweden deeply involved in the Western integration in the field of the security.18
Indeed, it is possible to regard those process in different ways. Both as a aspiration to improve preconditions for participation in peace keeping operations together with NATO, and as a preparation for the membership in the alliance in the near perspective. Future will show...
Anyway, when Finland's political leadership will finally determine its position, the necessary work will be already done, and any difficulties connected to military aspects of NATO membership — compared with many other countries « of the second wave » of the alliance's expansion - would not arise. Again quoting General G.Hegglund. In 1999 he stated: « we speak the same language with NATO, and Finland is in all essential is prepared for membership in NATO ». And then Defence Minister A.Taina said, though using metaphors, but even more definitely: "Finland has engaged with NATO but the wedding day has not been decided yet.". Hegglund's successor Admiral J.Kaskeala recently confirmed, that the Finnish army is completely ready for NATO membership. 19
To put it briefly, if the denouncing of military non-alignment becomes the fact, it will take place not because of that above mentioned military or other threats have come nearer. It would be the logical result of "«step by step" policy of rapproachement and military-political interaction with structures of NATO.
I think, however, that the final political decision would take some time depending on all possible variants of the development. But it is necessary to be ready for it beforehand. Anyway, it is hardly possible to expect, that the Finns would inform Russia on it in advance and even less they would be eager to discus it with us , as it was used in the Soviet-Finnish relations (yet, at the end of 80-th Finland departed from this practice). Most likely, we officially would learn about it as a fait accompli.
The year 2004 has been even more often mentioned in the analyses of many experts and statements of some politicians . There is not excluded, that Finland's policy of military non-alignment could be changed at those time, when, as expected, both NATO, and EU will incorporate new members I personally do think, that so radical step will require more time, taking into account that the final decision on the time of Baltic states membership in NATO has not been taken yet.
However it is possible to expect, that, anyway, distance separating Finland's and Sweden's membership in NATO from membership of Baltic countries, would be rather short.. Though, for example, in view of former Prime Minister E.Aho (Center Party) the position of Lipponen's government on non-alignment stands only as tactical stalling before the time of decision making in 2004.20 By the way, the above mentioned White paper on security policy of Finland approved by the Parliament in 2001, covers only the period up till 2004. In June 2002 the Government has established a special working group for the preparation of a new White Paper, which will be submitted to the Parliament in the autumn 2004. There is expected, that within the framework of this report also the final position on NATO membership will be determined. Probably, also in Sweden the events will develop on similar way. It is possible to expect, that both countries will act coordinated and will submit the applications to NATO simultaneously (as it was in the EU case).
Some analysts do not exclude, that in Finland a basic decision on NATO membership will be taken earlier, not waiting for the Swedes. They are referring to the fact that during the past ten years a certain independence from Swedens decisions has developed in Finland. It was evidently demonstrated, when Finland joined the EMU, which was partly motivated be security needs, while Sweden preferred to remain "euro" zone.
However, similar variant concerning membership in NATO seems to be hardly possible. For Sweden the geopolitical position of Finland as the country located between her and Russia, always has had specific importance. Hardly the Swedes would want, maintaining the policy of military non-alignment, to have between themselves and Russia NATO's Finland. And whether they in general would want to remain in loneliness in the North of Europe and Baltic, if all other countries of this region will be the members of NATO, and Sweden will become a « non-aligned enclave" within the northern flank of NATO ? Shortly to say, the position of Finland may get coming years a special importance for the security and stability in Northern Europe.
Notes
Nordisk sikkerhet. Militaer balansen 2002-2003. Den norske Atlanterhavskomite, Oslo, 2002,s, 50
2Olav F.Knudsen. Cooperative security in tne Baltic Sea region. Challot Papers 33, Paris, 1998, рр. 9-10
3 Der Spiegel, №3, Marz,2001
4 Тhe White Paper on Finnish Security and Defence Policy ( 2001), http//www.nnss.org
5 Helsingin Sanomat,25.11.2002 6 Helsingin Sanomat, 29.05.2002 7The Year book of Finnish Foreign Policy 2002, SUPI, p.27
8 Svenska Dagbladet,25.03.2002 9 Helsingin Sanomat. Svenska Dagbladet,15.03.1997 10 Ch. Pursiainen. S.Saari.Et tu Brute ! Finland`s NATO Option and Russia. UPI Report1,2002 Helsinki,рр.5,46
11 «Ilta-Sanomat,20.09.1999 12 Demari, 21.01.2003. 13 T.Ries.In from the cold. Finland`s security political course after the could war(the unpublished paper presented at Leangkollen,Norway, January, 1999)
14 M.Koivisto. Witness to History. Hurst & C, London,1997,p.248
15 Viikkolehti,17.01.2003 16 Helsngin Sanomat, 1.02.2003
17 P.Ervasti, J.Laakso. Karhun naapurista NATON kainaloon. WSOY,Helsinki,2001, s.127
18 T.Vaahtoranta,T.Forsberg. Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied, SUPI Working Papers 29(2000),Helsinki,2000,p.41
19 Keskussuomalainen,3.09.2002 20 The Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 2002, UPI, Helsinki, 2002, p.31
